This article aims to bring philosophical and legal aspects of the discussions of the problem of emergency together by employing classic philosophical views on the problem of emergency to categorize dominating paradigms of legal interpretation in the American Supreme Court.
INTRODUCTION
9/11 stirred renewed reflection on the problem of balancing security and rights during national emergencies. This was the case within both philosophy and law. In the spirit of this special edition of the Baltic Journal of Law and Politics this article aims to bring the two aspects of the discussions together by employing classic philosophical views on the problem of emergency to categorize dominating paradigms of legal interpretation in the American Supreme Court.
In the first part of the article I employ philosophical categories framed by In the second part of the article I ask how this tradition has played out in the context of the terrorism cases. I argue that the first four cases that were brought against the government confirmed the procedural model as the Court"s primary model for evaluating legal problems related to emergencies. But I also argue that the Court"s latest decision on this issue, Boumediene v. Bush from 2008, introduces a shift from the previous general tendency to rely primarily on a procedural model towards including substantial rights concerns. Thereby Boumediene re-actualizes the rights model. A major part of the literature on the problem of emergency since 9/11 has been devoted to the view that the terrorism conflict triggers a radical change in the usual legal order and challenges previously existing legal paradigms of emergency governance.
In a memorandum from 2002, the government stated: "the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm" and argued that previous paradigms of international law do not apply in this new kind of conflict. 
THE RIGHTS MODEL
The most famous American Supreme Court case related to the problem of emergency is the case Ex Parte Milligan from 1866. It is famous because of its ringing endorsement of the unchanging nature of fundamental constitutional rights.
In a much-quoted paragraph, in the opinion of the Court Justice Davis uncompromisingly confirms that:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false, for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence, as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort [by the secessionist Southern States] to throw off its just authority. ISSN 2029-0405 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2010
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During the war his powers must be without limit, because, if defending, the means of offence may be nearly illimitable; or, if acting offensively, his resources must be proportionate to the end in view, -"to conquer a peace." 11 Thus, rather than defending the trial by military commission of Milligan on a narrow basis, the government"s brief set-out to defend an expansive interpretation of the president"s war powers in general.
Writing for the Court, Justice Davis resolved the question of the legality of Milligan"s trial by military commission on purely statutory grounds with reference to an act passed in March 1863 in which Congress had sanctioned a limited suspension of habeas corpus. 12 But, as the above quote illustrates, the opinion also went well beyond the narrow question of whether the military commission had jurisdiction to try Milligan and included a rebuff of the government"s general theory of emergency. Notably, Locke was a strong advocate of limiting the powers of the king, but he found that the problem of predicting emergencies forced him to introduce and justify this extraordinary executive power:
[…] since in some governments the law-making power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution: and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities, that may concern the public; or to make such laws, as will do no harm, if they are executed with inflexible rigor, on all occasions, and upon all persons, that may come in their way, therefore there 21 Cited in Andrew C. The racially based detention was propelled into action through a number of Presidential Orders that authorized "exclusion" "removal" and "relocation" of people living in designated areas on the West Coast. 31 The presidential orders were sanctioned by Congress through the Act of March 21, 1942 , which made it a 24 Ibid. 25 Which is the literal meaning of the term "jurisdiction". 26 [w]e may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and threatened invasion, calls upon the military to scrutinize any relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas. 35 This principle has no direct constitutional underpinning. 33 Korematsu in particular, which upheld the government"s curfew policies long after these policies had merged into a scheme of mass detention, has since been publicly denounced by currently sitting justices of the Supreme Court, who have called it "a mistake" or taken to task for giving "a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial classification" (Eric L. 34 Hirabayashi, supra note 26, at 1385. 35 Ibid. 36 Even though Justice Stone"s notion of "time of war and threatened invasion" may be said to paraphrase the Suspension Clause"s notion of "cases of rebellion or invasion", the issue in Hirabayashi did not concern Congress" power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus. Congress had not invoked the Suspension Clause, and the Court had constructed the problematics of the cases so as not to be related to the issue of detention without trial in any legally relevant way. 37 Hirabayashi, supra note 26, at 1382. 38 Korematsu, supra note 27, at 194.
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The logic of emergency that was introduced in these cases was strongly criticized in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Jackson. 39 He famously warned that once a court sanctioned a government"s claim to special emergency powers Because of the wide repudiation of the Japanese internment cases it is unlikely that the principle of pressing public necessity, on which they were decided, 39 There were three justices who dissented in Korematsu. 42 Jackson noted that "[t]he chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history," thus seemingly implying that political prudence should sometimes overrule constitutional restraints in executive decision making (see ibid., at 208). 43 Ibid., at 207. Jackson argued that Hirabayashi illustrates this point (ibid., at 246). In addition he argued that, in spite of the Court"s attempt to limit the scope of Hirabayashi"s precedence, "the principle of racial discrimination is [now] pushed from support of mild measures to very harsh ones, and from temporary deprivations to indeterminate ones. And the precedent which it is said requires us to do so is Hirabayashi" (see ibid., at 247). For when a like mode is lacking in a republic, it is necessary either that it be ruined by observing the orders or that it break them so as not to be ruined. In a republic, one would not wish anything ever to happen that has to be governed with extraordinary modes. For although the extraordinary mode may do good then, nonetheless the example does ill; for if one sets up a habit of breaking the orders for the sake of good, then later, under that coloring, they are broken for ill.
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Modern writers have since taken up this procedural model of emergency governance as a key to securing proportionate governance during emergencies.
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The basic idea of modern versions of the procedural model is that dividing the decision-making power facilitates a response that is both effective and fair.
However, when Machiavelli articulated the above warning, the checks he had in mind was not a permanent legislative body, but instead a division of the executive 44 It should be noted however that the coram nobis hearings which overturned the cases was based on new evidence towards the racial underpinnings of the government"s policies and not on the constitutionally problematic principle of emergency which was introduced in the cases (see Emily Hartz, supra note 31). 45 In these cases the government tried instead to underpin its attempts at extra-legal reasoning with a set of cases decided during the Civil War known as "the Prize cases". In this sense, the two authors argue, the courts "have tied their role to that of the more political branches", 53 and they "have shown great reticence about 48 In ancient Rome the institution of dictatorship was a constitutional mechanism for lending special authorities to a single person -a dictator -for a limited period of time aimed at addressing a particular threat to national security. The appointment of the dictator was controlled by a complex system of checks and balances in order to ensure that he was not able to abuse his special authorities beyond the task of dealing with the emergency at hand. For further details see John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, supra note 47). 49 The influence of Machiavelli"s analysis of the Roman institution of dictatorship can be traced to the discussions of emergency powers held by e.g. Rousseau (Du contrat social); Schmitt (Die Diktatur); and Rossiter (Constitutional Dictatorship). The literature on emergency after 9/11 continues to refer to the Roman dictatorship as a basic model for emergency governance. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, "The Emergency Constitution," Yale Law Review 113(5) (2004); J John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, supra note 47; Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, supra note 5). 50 The following observation from The Prince illustrates this point: "[...] there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred" (Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 (1515)), Chapter XVI). 51 While there is no indication that the framers were influenced by Machiavelli"s discussion of the need for formal procedures governing decision-making process in emergencies, there is amble evidence that the Constitution"s division of the war powers signifies a conscious strategy to curb the president"s powers even during emergencies as a means to secure liberal values. Ibid., at 44. 54 Ibid. 55 In fact most of the standard textbook cases on emergency law exemplify the process-based approach. 56 Both The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and The Wage Stabilization Board were established under the authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 798) which was part of a massive federal wage and price stabilization effort designed to support defence production during the war. 57 Youngstown, supra note 20, at 865. The order stated that: …a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field. Therefore, the order went on: …in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as hereinafter provided (Executive Order 10340). Quirin. 59 The Youngstown case nevertheless consists of no less than seven different opinions because each of the five concurring justices also wrote separate concurrences. The number of judges who felt the need to write a separate opinion illustrates the complexity of the theoretical issue of how to interpret the constitutional division of powers in relation to the problem of emergency (see also Emily Hartz, supra note 31). 60 Youngstown, supra note 20, at 866. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., at 867. In the context of emergency jurisprudence, the fact to be noted however is that the Court goes a long way in its effort not to tie the power to convene military commissions to the presidential power as commander in chief alone. With the use of a "clever interpretation" of an ambiguous statute, 74 the Court managed to avoid the necessity of dealing with the question of whether, "presidential authority itself sufficed to establish military commissions", but instead emphasises the role of Congress.
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The third and final step of the argument was to make the case that the Fifth Therefore, while the decision can -and has been -criticized for being driven by purely pragmatic concerns and providing a smokescreen for a constitutionally problematic result, the Court"s struggle to tie the argument in with the principle of separations of power bears witness to the procedural model as key to understanding emergency jurisprudence in the US.
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But of course the case also proves a more pessimistic point: that the principle of separation of powers is by no means a security against infringements on rights during emergencies.
THE TERRORISM CASES
The recent terrorism conflict added a new set of concrete dilemmas to the Court"s evaluation of the problem of emergency.
While the Bush administration"s approach to the balance between security and rights is well documented elsewhere, 80 the interesting question to ask in the context of this article is how the Supreme Court responded to the administration"s approach. 
THE TERRORISM CASES AND THE PROCEDURAL MODEL
The first four cases seemed to confirm the persistence of the procedural model as the main jurisprudential strategy for dealing with issues of national emergency. 101 It is to be noted that Kennedy did qualify this point noting that "The real risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely soon to abate" (ibid., at 793). He further noted that "In cases involving foreign citizens detained abroad by the Executive, it likely would be both an impractical and unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody" (ibid.). And further: "If and when habeas corpus jurisdiction applies, as it does in these cases, then proper deference can be accorded to reasonable procedures for screening and initial detention under lawful and proper conditions of confinement and treatment for a reasonable period of time. Domestic exigencies, furthermore, might also impose such onerous burdens on the Government that here, too, the Judicial Branch would be required to devise sensible rules for staying habeas corpus proceedings until the Government can comply with its requirements in a responsible way [...]" (ibid.). But he also underscored that "[t]he cases before us, however, do not involve detainees who have been held for a short period of time while awaiting their CSRT determinations. Were that the case, or were it probable that the Court of Appeals could complete a prompt review of their applications, the case for requiring temporary ISSN 2029-0405 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2010
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[t]he Framers" inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty.
102
At one point he (knowingly or unknowingly) even came close to echoing Constant"s pragmatic arguments in favor of upholding rights at all times:
Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There are further considerations, however. Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom"s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.
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Kennedy insists that
[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law. Kennedy"s conclusion was directly tied in with the principle that constitutional rights do not diminish during times of crisis.
Boumediene therefore establishes a strong precedence for engaging substantial issues of rights when evaluating issues related to emergencies.
abstention or exhaustion of alternative remedies would be much stronger" (ibid., at 794) and concluded that "[t]hese qualifications no longer pertain here" (ibid.). 102 Ibid., at 742. 103 Ibid., at 797. 104 Ibid., at 798. 105 Milligan, supra note 4, at 76. See also discussion of this quote above.
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CONCLUSION
The Court"s opinion in Boumediene v. Bush is noteworthy alone for the fact that it delivered yet another blow to the Bush administration"s detention policies.
But it is first and foremost remarkable for going against both the President and
Congress during an ongoing crisis and for its willingness to engage substantial issues of rights in so doing. As I (with Kyritsis) have argued elsewhere, it shows that "the majority in Boumediene does not consider congressional authorization the be-all and end-all in the emergency context. It confirmed that the established doctrine of judicial review extends to cases related to issues of national security." While Boumediene enlarges our understanding of the problem of emergency in relation to the American Constitution, it also adds to the complexity of the issue and thereby arguably confirms Justice Jackson"s lament in a concurring opinion in
Youngstown that when it comes to the question of the problem of emergency
[a] century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. 107 
